Top 256 Quotes & Sayings by Zbigniew Brzezinski - Page 2

World War II and the ensuing Cold War compelled the United States to develop a sustained commitment to Western Europe and the Far East.

Basically, I see Iran as an authentic nation-state. And that authentic identity gives it cohesion, which most of the Middle East lacks.

The fact of the matter is the Arab elites are more inclined to accommodate our wishes because of certain overlapping interests that are often financial. That is not the case with the Arab masses.

During the nineteenth century, men died believing in the cause of royalty or republicanism. In reality, much of their sacrifice was rendered on the altar of the new nationalism.

AIPAC has consistently opposed a two-state solution, and a lot of members of Congress have been intimidated, and I don't think that's healthy.

Americans don't learn about the world; they don't study world history, other than American history in a very one-sided fashion, and they don't study geography.

Both World War II and the subsequent Cold War gave America's involvement in world affairs a clear focus. The objectives of foreign policy were relatively easy to define, and they could be imbued with high moral content.

I think we have to pay attention to the Arab masses not just in the Gulf States, but also in the hinterlands.

As America's nuclear strategic monopoly faded, the United States sought to create advantages elsewhere, notably in the peaceful cooperation between the United States and communist China under Deng Xiaoping.

The costly unilateralism of the younger Bush presidency led to a decade of war in the Middle East and the derailment of American foreign policy at large.

All the historical pretenders to global power originated in Eurasia.

I draw a very clear distinction between populism and democracy.

The congressional role in declaring war is especially important not when the United States is the victim of an attack, but when the United States is planning to wage war abroad.

Given the accelerating velocity of history, we should begin charting deliberately the next phase in its trajectory.

With the decline of America's global preeminence, weaker countries will be more susceptible to the assertive influence of major regional powers.

Moderation and bipartisan consensus go hand in hand.

Because America is a democracy, public support for presidential foreign-policy decisions is essential.

The culture of self-gratification and deregulation that began during the Clinton years and continued under President George W. Bush led to the bursting of one stock market bubble at the turn of the century and a full-scale financial crash less than a decade later.

One-sided national economic triumphs cannot be achieved in the increasingly interwoven global economy without precipitating calamitous consequences for everyone.

I would like to promote internal change in Iran - which is more likely if we don't fuse Iranian nationalism with Iranian fundamentalism.

Americans must place greater emphasis on the more subtle dimensions of national power, such as innovation, education, the balance of force and diplomacy, and the quality of political leadership.

It is in the U.S. interest to engage Iran in serious negotiations - on both regional security and the nuclear challenge it poses.

I do think America has made it quite clear that it is in the interest both of America and China to avoid situations in which they will be pushed toward a collision.

Neither the United States nor Israel has the capacity to impose a unilateral solution in the Middle East.

The Sino-American competition involves two significant realities that distinguish it from the Cold War: neither party is excessively ideological in its orientation; and both parties recognize that they really need mutual accommodation.

I'm all in favour of grand important speeches, but the president then has to link his sermons to a strategy.

To his credit, Obama has undertaken a truly ambitious effort to redefine the United States' view of the world and to reconnect the United States with the emerging historical context of the twenty-first century. He has done this remarkably well.

The security link between us and Europe is very important for European security but also for our security.

We don't have a public that really understands the world anymore, and in the age of complexity, that problem becomes much more difficult.

Pessimism about America's future tends to underestimate its capacity for self-renewal.

Terrorism cannot be isolated from its political, historical, and even social context.

The problem with the Iranian regime, of course is, one, its unsettling effects on the Sunnis, particularly Saudi Arabia, and, secondly, its potential threat to Israel.

A president who aspires to be recognized as a global leader should not personally stake out a foreign-policy goal, commit himself eloquently to its attainment, and then yield the ground when confronted by firm opposition.

Economically, we are, to some significant degree, interdependent with Chinese well-being. That is a great asset.

You go to Paris, or you go to Portugal, you go to Poland, and you ask, 'Who are you people?' They'll tell you, we're Portuguese, we're Spanish, we're Polish. Who are the people that are really European? The people in Brussels, in the E.U. bureaucracy. Europe has not been able to move to the level of patriotic identification with the concept.

I was deeply involved in the decision that President Jimmy Carter made to boycott the Olympics in Moscow in 1980.

Eurasia is home to most of the world's politically assertive and dynamic states.

It is axiomatic that the security of America and Europe are linked.

Pakistan's political instability is its greatest vulnerability, and a decline in U.S. power would reduce America's ability to aid Pakistan's consolidation and development.

The first 'world' war was in reality the last European war fought by globally significant European powers.

War triggers unforeseeable military dynamics and sets off massive political shocks, creating new problems as well as new opportunities.

Japan needs the American market and it also needs American security protection. Japan also needs America as the necessary stabilizer of an orderly world system with economies truly open to international trade.

America's victory in the Cold War was not without painful social costs.

The Chinese are really good at diplomacy - and even at making their interlocutors feel very uncomfortable.

I realise that in an electoral campaign, you don't want to antagonise large groups which are highly motivated.

The mullahs are part of the past in Iran, not its future. But change in Iran will come through engagement, not through confrontation.

Human affairs require some combination of moral commitment with disciplined political action. And that is what keeps me intrigued and challenged and wanting to influence events.

The financial catastrophe of 2008 nearly precipitated a calamitous economic depression, jolting America and much of the West into a sudden recognition of their systemic vulnerability to unregulated greed.

America's decline would set in motion tectonic shifts undermining the political stability of the entire Middle East.

We can't have an intelligent foreign policy unless we have an intelligent public, because we're a democracy.

A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development.

The future is inherently full of discontinuities, and lessons of the past must be applied with enormous caution.

During the twentieth century, men fought on behalf of nationalism. Yet the wars they fought were also engendered by dislocations in world markets and by social revolution stimulated by the coming of the industrial age.

Rushing to war is not a wise course of action.

The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

We all have the right to comment about each other.

Look: I don't want to live with a nuclear Iran. I would like to make it uncomfortable for them to seek it.

The external Soviet empire lasted 45 years. It is shattered, beyond redemption or repair.

The difference between the Bush I war against Iraq and the Bush II war against Iraq is that in the first one, we appealed to the sentiments and interests of the different groupings in the region and had them with us. In the second one, we did it on our own, on the basis of false premises, with extremely brutality and lack of political skill.

The potential for regional conflict in the absence of an internationally active America is real.