A Quote by Elvira Nabiullina

Of course I welcome all the normalization of monetary policy. I think monetary policy should be normal. — © Elvira Nabiullina
Of course I welcome all the normalization of monetary policy. I think monetary policy should be normal.
One factor that favors easier adjustment in EMEs is that U.S. monetary policy normalization has been and should continue to be gradual, as long as the U.S. economy evolves roughly as expected.
Monetary policy transmission encompasses the whole continuum of interest rates; of course, the central bank only determines the overnight policy rate.
Inflation is certainly low and stable and, measured in unemployment and labour-market slack, the economy has made a lot of progress. The pace of growth is disappointingly slow, mostly because productivity growth has been very slow, which is not really something amenable to monetary policy. It comes from changes in technology, changes in worker skills and a variety of other things, but not monetary policy, in particular.
We need to keep in mind the well-established fact that the full effects of monetary policy are felt only after long lags. This means that policy makers cannot wait until they have achieved their objectives to begin adjusting policy.
... it's important to have the right monetary policy. It's important for, to have the right fiscal policy. But it's nowhere near as important as just the normal regenerative capacity of American capitalism.
I've always believed in expansionary monetary policy and if necessary fiscal policy when the economy is depressed.
Fiscal policy, monetary policy, they need to work together to try and raise the level of growth.
Beyond monetary policy, fiscal policy has traditionally played an important role in dealing with severe economic downturns.
Monetary conditions exert an enormous influence on stock prices. Indeed, the monetary climate - primarily the trend in interest rates and Federal Reserve policy - is the dominant factor in determining the stock market's major direction.
The Great Depression was not a sign of the failure of monetary policy or a result of the failure of the market system as was widely interpreted. It was instead a consequence of a very serious government failure, in particular a failure in the monetary authorities to do what they'd initially been set up to do.
When there's downward pressure on growth, one choice is to adjust economic policy, increase deficits, relax monetary policy. That might have a short-term benefit, but may not be beneficial for the future.
During the last campaign I knew what was happening. You know, they mocked me for my foreign policy and they laughed at my monetary policy. No more. No more.
In 1977, when I started my first job at the Federal Reserve Board as a staff economist in the Division of International Finance, it was an article of faith in central banking that secrecy about monetary policy decisions was the best policy: Central banks, as a rule, did not discuss these decisions, let alone their future policy intentions.
I don't think that the ECB should compensate for the lack of reforms in some countries... But it is clear that monetary policy can help countries and continents to rebound faster.
I think that sharing information about our economies, the way that the central banks do in Basel and other forums, is quite useful. But it's sharing information. It's not coordinating policy. It's not coordinating a single monetary policy.
I'm not trying to be diplomatic. I'm trying to be more nuanced and realistic. I think there has to be a serious examination of the shortcomings of the Euro structure. Euro central institutions, whether it be fiscal policy, monetary policy, financial regulation, are simply not as robust as they are in a currency that has a national government behind it.
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